Husserl on Perceptual Constancy

European Journal of Philosophy 20 (1):145-165 (2012)
Abstract
Abstract: In philosophy, perceptual constancy refers to the puzzling phenomenon of the perception of properties of objects despite our changing experience of those properties. Husserl developed a sophisticated description of perceptual constancy. In this paper I sketch Husserl's approach, which focuses on the suggestion that perception is partly constituted by the continuous interplay of intention and fulfilment. Unlike many contemporary theories, this framework gives us a way to understand the relationship between different appearances of the same object. I will show how Husserl's work connects with contemporary theories which emphasize perceptual constancy from particular perspectives. These theories include appeals to perspectival properties and Cohen's counterfactual theory. Also, I show how Husserl's account shares important themes with Kelly's recent interpretation of Merleau-Ponty on perceptual constancy
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2010.00405.x
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Michael Madary (2011). The Dorsal Stream and the Visual Horizon. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):423-438.
Kenneth Williford (2013). Husserl's Hyletic Data and Phenomenal Consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):501-519.

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