David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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European Journal of Philosophy 20 (1):145-165 (2012)
Abstract: In philosophy, perceptual constancy refers to the puzzling phenomenon of the perception of properties of objects despite our changing experience of those properties. Husserl developed a sophisticated description of perceptual constancy. In this paper I sketch Husserl's approach, which focuses on the suggestion that perception is partly constituted by the continuous interplay of intention and fulfilment. Unlike many contemporary theories, this framework gives us a way to understand the relationship between different appearances of the same object. I will show how Husserl's work connects with contemporary theories which emphasize perceptual constancy from particular perspectives. These theories include appeals to perspectival properties and Cohen's counterfactual theory. Also, I show how Husserl's account shares important themes with Kelly's recent interpretation of Merleau-Ponty on perceptual constancy
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References found in this work BETA
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Citations of this work BETA
Michael Madary (2011). The Dorsal Stream and the Visual Horizon. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):423-438.
Kenneth Williford (2013). Husserl's Hyletic Data and Phenomenal Consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):501-519.
Michael Madary (2013). Anticipation and Variation in Visual Content. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):335-347.
Michael Madary (2014). Intentionality and Virtual Objects: The Case of Qiu Chengwei’s Dragon Sabre. Ethics and Information Technology 16 (3):219-225.
Nicola Liberati & Shoji Nagataki (2015). The AR Glasses’ “Non-Neutrality”: Their Knock-on Effects on the Subject and on the Giveness of the Object. Ethics and Information Technology 17 (2):125-137.
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