David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):325-351 (2011)
Does intention presuppose personal identity, and what relevance does the issue have for the contemporary personal identity debate? I distinguish three ways in which intention might be said to presuppose personal identity, focusing mainly on causal presupposition and content presupposition. I argue that intention often causally presupposes personal identity. I argue that intention does not content-presuppose personal identity. The former result is a potential basis for a Butlerian circularity objection to Lockean theories of personal identity. The latter result undercuts a prominent Lockean reply to ‘the thinking animal’ objection which has recently supplanted traditional Butlerian circularity objections in the personal identity debate
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
G. E. M. Anscombe (1975). The First Person. In Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language. Oxford University Press. 45â65.
Annette C. Baier (1970). Act and Intent. Journal of Philosophy 67 (19):648-658.
Annette C. Baier (1977). The Intentionality of Intentions. Review of Metaphysics 30 (3):389 - 414.
Gennaro Chierchia (1989). Anaphora and Attitudes de Se. In Renate Bartsch, J. F. A. K. van Benthem & P. van Emde Boas (eds.), Semantics and Contextual Expression. Foris Publications. 11--1.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Marya Schechtman (2010). Memory and Identity. Philosophical Studies 153 (1):65-79.
Deborah C. Smith (2001). Parfit on Personal Identity. Idealistic Studies 31 (2/3):169-181.
Eric Olson (2006). Is There a Bodily Criterion of Personal Identity? In Fraser MacBride (ed.), Identity and Modality. Oxford University Press. 242.
Christopher Buford (2009). Memory, Quasi-Memory, and Pseudo-Quasi-Memory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):465 – 478.
Chris Heathwood (2011). The Significance of Personal Identity to Abortion. Bioethics 25 (4):230-232.
James Baillie (1997). Personal Identity and Mental Content. Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):323-33.
Stephan Blatti (2007). Animalism and Personal Identity. In M. Bekoff (ed.), Encyclopedia of Human-Animal Relationships. Greenwood Press.
John Perry (ed.) (1975). Personal Identity. University of California Press.
Jennifer Radden (2004). Identity: Personal Identity, Characterization Identity, and Mental Disorder. In , The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 133--46.
Steve Matthews (2010). Personal Identity, the Causal Condition, and the Simple View. Philosophical Papers 39 (2):183-208.
Stan Klein & Shaun Nichols (2012). Memory and the Sense of Personal Identity. Mind 121 (483):677-702.
E. Furberg (2012). Advance Directives and Personal Identity: What Is the Problem? Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37 (1):60-73.
Added to index2011-12-24
Total downloads60 ( #24,539 of 1,098,129 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #33,031 of 1,098,129 )
How can I increase my downloads?