David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):325-351 (2011)
Does intention presuppose personal identity, and what relevance does the issue have for the contemporary personal identity debate? I distinguish three ways in which intention might be said to presuppose personal identity, focusing mainly on causal presupposition and content presupposition. I argue that intention often causally presupposes personal identity. I argue that intention does not content-presuppose personal identity. The former result is a potential basis for a Butlerian circularity objection to Lockean theories of personal identity. The latter result undercuts a prominent Lockean reply to ‘the thinking animal’ objection which has recently supplanted traditional Butlerian circularity objections in the personal identity debate
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References found in this work BETA
Derek Parfit (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press.
Timothy Williamson (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press.
John Locke (2008/1995). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Oxford University Press.
Gareth Evans (1982). Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press.
Michael Thompson (2008). Life and Action: Elementary Structures of Practice and Practical Thought. Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Andrew M. Bailey (2015). Animalism. Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.
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