Ontological commitment: Between Quine and Duhem

Philosophical Perspectives 10:317 - 341 (1996)
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DOI 10.2307/2216250
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David Manley (2009). When Best Theories Go Bad. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):392-405.
Lieven Decock (2002). Quine's Weak and Strong Indispensability Argument. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 33 (2):231-250.
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