Specular highlights as a guide to perceptual content

Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):629 – 639 (2008)
This article is a contribution to a recent debate in the philosophy of perception between Alva Noë and Sean Kelly. Noë (2004) has argued that the perspectival part of perception is simultaneously represented along with the non-perspectival part of perception. Kelly (2004) argues that the two parts of perception are not always simultaneously experienced. Here I focus on specular highlights as an example of the perspectival part of perception. First I give a priori motivation to think that specular highlights are experienced at the same time as non-perspectival properties, which challenges Kelly's position. Then I discuss psychophysical work by Andrew Blake and Heinrich B lthoff (1990) which seems to show that specular highlights are not represented in the way that Noë (2004) would suggest. In the third section I suggest a compromise between Noë and Kelly: specular highlights are not represented, but rather play an evidentiary role in the representation of perspective-independent properties, like gloss and shape. I conclude with some thoughts about how this study can generalize to other kinds of experience.
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DOI 10.1080/09515080802412347
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Tye (2003). Consciousness, Color, and Content. Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233 - 235.

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Citations of this work BETA
Michael Madary (2012). Husserl on Perceptual Constancy. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (1):145-165.

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