The price of Frankfurt's compatibilism

Abstract
In this paper I argue that there is an inherent difficulty in Frankfurt’s theory of moral responsibility. After developing Frankfurt’s account of the necessary conditions for moral responsibility complete with its thesis that the causes of our actions are irrelevant for moral responsibility, I discuss his notion of “real want,” “identification,” and personhood in search of his account of the sufficient conditions for moral responsibility. I conclude by arguing that there is a tension betweenFrankfurt’s notion of a person (and thus his notion of moral responsibility) and Frankfurtian causal irrelevance
Keywords Compatibilism  Ethics  Morality  Responsibility  Frankfurt, H
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