“Just-so” stories about “inner cognitive africa”: Some doubts about Sorensen's evolutionary epistemology of thought experiments
Biology and Philosophy 12 (2) (1997)
|Abstract||Roy Sorensen advances an evolutionary explanation of our capacity for thought experiments which doubles as a naturalized epistemological justification. I argue Sorensens explanation fails to satisfy key elements of environmental-selectionist explanations and so fails to carry epistemic force. I then argue that even if Sorensen succeeds in showing the adaptive utility of our capacity, he still fails to establish its reliability and hence epistemic utility. I conclude Sorensens account comes to little more than a just-so story.|
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