Minimal Authorship (of Sorts)

Philosophical Studies 154 (3):373-387 (2011)
I propose a minimal account of authorship that specifies the fundamental nature of the author-relation and its minimal domain composition in terms of a three-place causal-intentional relation holding between agents and sort-relative works. I contrast my account with the minimal account tacitly held by most authorship theories, which is a two-place relation holding between agents and works simpliciter. I claim that only my view can ground productive and informative principled distinctions between collective production and collective authorship.
Keywords Authorship  Appropriation  Works  Collaboration  Authors
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
J. Angelo Corlett (2001). Collective Moral Responsibility. Journal of Social Philosophy 32 (4):573–584.
Berys Gaut (1997). Film Authorship and Collaboration. In Richard Allen & Murray Smith (eds.), Film Theory and Philosophy. Oxford University Press. 149--172.

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