Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (2):471-491 (2012)
|Abstract||Call an argument a ‘happy sorites’ if it is a sorites argument with true premises and a false conclusion. It is a striking fact that although most philosophers working on the sorites paradox find it at prima facie highly compelling that the premises of the sorites paradox are true and its conclusion false, few (if any) of the standard theories on the issue ultimately allow for happy sorites arguments. There is one philosophical view, however, that appears to allow for at least some happy sorites arguments: strict finitism in the philosophy of mathematics. My aim in this paper is to explore to what extent this appearance is accurate. As we shall see, this question is far from trivial. In particular, I will discuss two arguments that threaten to show that strict finitism cannot consistently accept happy sorites arguments, but I will argue that (given reasonable assumptions on strict finitistic logic) these arguments can ultimately be avoided, and the view can indeed allow for happy sorites arguments|
|Keywords||Finitism Vagueness Sorites Sorites paradox Strict finitism Intuitionism Constructivism Cut elimination Induction|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Mark Colyvan (2010). A Topological Sorites. Journal of Philosophy 107 (6):311-325.
Matti Eklund (2006). Schiffer on Vagueness. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):12–23.
J. P. Bendegem (2012). A Defense of Strict Finitism. Constructivist Foundations 7 (2):141-149.
Ofra Magidor (2007). Strict Finitism Refuted? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):403-411.
Richard DeWitt (1992). Remarks on the Current Status of the Sorites Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Research 17 (1):93.
Samuel Levey (2002). Leibniz and the Sorites. The Leibniz Review 12:25-49.
Samuel William Mitchell (1992). Dummett's Intuitionism is Not Strict Finitism. Synthese 90 (3):437 - 458.
Mark Sainsbury (1992). Sorites Paradoxes and the Transition Question. Philosophical Papers 21 (3):177-190.
Susanne Bobzien (2002). Chrysippus and the Epistemic Theory of Vagueness. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (1):217-238.
Tamás Pólya & László Tarnay (1999). Sorites Paradox and Conscious Experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):165-165.
Eugene O. Mills (2002). Fallibility and the Phenomenal Sorites. Noûs 36 (3):384-407.
Otávio Bueno & Mark Colyvan (2012). Just What is Vagueness? Ratio 25 (1):19-33.
John-Michael Kuczynski (2006). Implicit Comparatives and the Sorites. History and Philosophy of Logic 27 (1):1-8.
Anthony Everett (1996). Qualia and Vagueness. Synthese 106 (2):205-226.
Added to index2011-08-26
Total downloads41 ( #32,626 of 722,750 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,247 of 722,750 )
How can I increase my downloads?