David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 1 (1):86-101 (1998)
The argument between retributivists and consequentialists about what morally justifies the punishment of offenders is incoherent. If we were to discover that all of the contending justifications were mistaken, there is no realistic prospect that this would lead us to abandon legal punishment. Justification of words, beliefs and deeds, can only be intelligible on the assumption that if one's justification were found to be invalid and there were no alternative justification, one would be prepared to stop saying, believing or doing what one has attempted to justify. Therefore, the moral standing or basis of our practices of punishing offenders can not rest on a justification of it.
|Keywords||Philosophy of Punishment Political Philosophy|
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