What's new about the new induction?

Synthese 148 (2):295 - 301 (2006)
Abstract
The problem of underdetermination is thought to hold important lessons for philosophy of science. Yet, as Kyle Stanford has recently argued, typical treatments of it offer only restatements of familiar philosophical problems. Following suggestions in Duhem and Sklar, Stanford calls for a New Induction from the history of science. It will provide proof, he thinks, of “the kind of underdetermination that the history of science reveals to be a distinctive and genuine threat to even our best scientific theories” (Stanford 2001, p. S12). This paper examines Stanford’s New Induction and argues that it – like the other forms of underdetermination that he criticizes – merely recapitulates familiar philosophical conundra.
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    References found in this work BETA
    Richard Boyd (1980). Scientific Realism and Naturalistic Epistemology. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:613-662.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    Emma Ruttkamp-Bloem (2013). Re-Enchanting Realism in Debate with Kyle Stanford. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 44 (1):201-224.
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