David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Explorations 14 (1):99-116 (2011)
How or in virtue of what does any one particular action differ from another? Available views on the issue of action individuation tend to emphasize the descriptive features of actions, such as where and when they occur, or what they cause or are caused by. I contend instead that actions are individuated by their normative features, such as what licenses them and what they license in turn. In this essay, deploying a suggestion from Sellars and Brandom, I argue specifically that actions are individuated by their normative function or role.
|Keywords||Action Individuating actions Normative functionalsim Wilfrid Sellars|
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References found in this work BETA
G. E. M. Anscombe (1957/2000). Intention. Harvard University Press.
Robert B. Brandom (1994). Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment. Harvard University Press.
Michael Bratman (2007). Structures of Agency: Essays. Oxford University Press.
John Martin Fischer (1982). Responsibility and Control. Journal of Philsophy 79 (January):24-40.
Citations of this work BETA
Katarzyna Paprzycka (2012). Ginet on the Problem of Action Externalization. Philosophia 40 (4):841-855.
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