Bayesian probability

Synthese 172 (1):119 - 127 (2010)
Abstract
Bayesian decision theory is here construed as explicating a particular concept of rational choice and Bayesian probability is taken to be the concept of probability used in that theory. Bayesian probability is usually identified with the agent’s degrees of belief but that interpretation makes Bayesian decision theory a poor explication of the relevant concept of rational choice. A satisfactory conception of Bayesian decision theory is obtained by taking Bayesian probability to be an explicatum for inductive probability given the agent’s evidence.
Keywords Bayesian probability  Logical probability  Inductive probability  Subjective probability  Degrees of belief  Decision theory  Expected utility  Explication  Carnap
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,031
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Rudolf Carnap (1952). The Continuum of Inductive Methods. [Chicago]University of Chicago Press.
Patrick Maher (2007). Explication Defended. Studia Logica 86 (2):331 - 341.

View all 6 references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-02-23

Total downloads

103 ( #10,493 of 1,101,088 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

10 ( #19,662 of 1,101,088 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.