Confirmation Theory
| Abstract | Predictions about the future and unrestricted universal generalizations are never logically implied by our observational evidence, which is limited to particular facts in the present and past. Nevertheless, propositions of these and other kinds are often said to be confirmed by observational evidence. A natural place to begin the study of confirmation theory is to consider what it means to say that some evidence E confirms a hypothesis H. | |||||||||
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