David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 59 (1):120-141 (1992)
This is an essay in the Bayesian theory of how opinions should be revised over time. It begins with a discussion of the principle that van Fraassen has dubbed "Reflection". This principle is not a requirement of rationality; a diachronic Dutch argument, that purports to show the contrary, is fallacious. But under suitable conditions, it is irrational to actually implement shifts in probability that violate Reflection. Conditionalization and probability kinematics are special cases of the principle not to implement shifts that violate Reflection; hence these principles are also requirements of rationality under suitable conditions, though not universal requirements of rationality
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Citations of this work BETA
Bas C. van Fraassen (1995). Belief and the Problem of Ulysses and the Sirens. Philosophical Studies 77 (1):7-37.
Igor Douven & Sylvia Wenmackers (forthcoming). Inference to the Best Explanation Versus Bayes’s Rule in a Social Setting. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv025.
Adam Corner & Ulrike Hahn (2013). Normative Theories of Argumentation: Are Some Norms Better Than Others? Synthese 190 (16):3579-3610.
Frederick Eberhardt & David Danks (2011). Confirmation in the Cognitive Sciences: The Problematic Case of Bayesian Models. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 21 (3):389-410.
Bas C. Van Fraassen (1995). Belief and the Problem of Ulysses and the Sirens. Philosophical Studies 77 (1):7 - 37.
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