Inductive logic and the ravens paradox

Philosophy of Science 66 (1):50-70 (1999)
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Abstract

Hempel's paradox of the ravens arises from the inconsistency of three prima facie plausible principles of confirmation. This paper uses Carnapian inductive logic to (a) identify which of the principles is false, (b) give insight into why this principle is false, and (c) identify a true principle that is sufficiently similar to the false one that failure to distinguish the two might explain why the false principle is prima facie plausible. This solution to the paradox is compared with a variety of other responses and is shown to differ from all of them.

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References found in this work

The Continuum of Inductive Methods.Rudolf Carnap - 1953 - Philosophy 28 (106):272-273.
Subjective and objective confirmation.Patrick Maher - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (2):149-174.
The white shoe is a red Herring.I. J. Good - 1966 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 17 (4):322.
The paradox of confirmation.J. L. Mackie - 1962 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 13 (52):265-277.

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