Prediction, Accommodation, and the Logic of Discovery

Abstract
A widely endorsed thesis in the philosophy of science holds that if evidence for a hypothesis was not known when the hypothesis was proposed, then that evidence confirms the hypothesis more strongly than would otherwise be the case. The thesis has been thought to be inconsistent with Bayesian confirmation theory, but the arguments offered for that view are fallacious. This paper shows how the special value of prediction can in fact be given Bayesian explanation. The explanation involves consideration of the reliability of the method by which the hypothesis was discovered, and thus reveals an intimate connection between the 'logic of discovery' and confirmation theory.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,978
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
Mario Alai (2012). Levin and Ghins on the “No Miracle” Argument and Naturalism. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (1):85-110.
Samuel Schindler (2008). Use-Novel Predictions and Mendeleev's Periodic Table: Response To. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):265-269.

View all 12 citations

Similar books and articles
Colin Howson (1988). Accommodation, Prediction and Bayesian Confirmation Theory. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:381 - 392.
David Harker (2006). Accommodation and Prediction: The Case of the Persistent Head. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):309-321.
Gregory Wheeler & Richard Scheines (2011). Causation, Association and Confirmation. In Stephan Hartmann, Marcel Weber, Wenceslao Gonzalez, Dennis Dieks & Thomas Uebe (eds.), Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation: New Trends and Old Ones Reconsidered. Springer. 37--51.
Patrick Maher (1993). Howson and Franklin on Prediction. Philosophy of Science 60 (2):329-340.
Mehul Shah (2007). Is It Justifiable to Abandon All Search for a Logic of Discovery? International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21 (3):253 – 269.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-05-29

Total downloads

18 ( #92,468 of 1,100,875 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

6 ( #44,113 of 1,100,875 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.