Prediction, Accommodation, and the Logic of Discovery

A widely endorsed thesis in the philosophy of science holds that if evidence for a hypothesis was not known when the hypothesis was proposed, then that evidence confirms the hypothesis more strongly than would otherwise be the case. The thesis has been thought to be inconsistent with Bayesian confirmation theory, but the arguments offered for that view are fallacious. This paper shows how the special value of prediction can in fact be given Bayesian explanation. The explanation involves consideration of the reliability of the method by which the hypothesis was discovered, and thus reveals an intimate connection between the 'logic of discovery' and confirmation theory.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 21,476
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Eric Scerri & John Worrall (2001). Prediction and the Periodic Table. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 32 (3):407-452.
John Worrall (2014). Prediction and Accommodation Revisited. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 45 (1):54-61.
Samuel Schindler (2014). Novelty, Coherence, and Mendeleev’s Periodic Table. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45 (1):62-69.

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Colin Howson (1988). Accommodation, Prediction and Bayesian Confirmation Theory. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:381 - 392.
David Harker (2006). Accommodation and Prediction: The Case of the Persistent Head. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):309-321.
Gregory Wheeler & Richard Scheines (2011). Causation, Association and Confirmation. In Stephan Hartmann, Marcel Weber, Wenceslao Gonzalez, Dennis Dieks & Thomas Uebe (eds.), Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation: New Trends and Old Ones Reconsidered. Springer 37--51.
Patrick Maher (1993). Howson and Franklin on Prediction. Philosophy of Science 60 (2):329-340.
Mehul Shah (2007). Is It Justifiable to Abandon All Search for a Logic of Discovery? International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21 (3):253 – 269.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

37 ( #113,670 of 1,911,757 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #180,473 of 1,911,757 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.