Symptomatic acts and the value of evidence in causal decision theory

Philosophy of Science 57 (3):479-498 (1990)
A "symptomatic act" is an act that is evidence for a state that it has no tendency to cause. In this paper I show that when the evidential value of a symptomatic act might influence subsequent choices, causal decision theory may initially recommend against its own use for those subsequent choices. And if one knows that one will nevertheless use causal decision theory to make those subsequent choices, causal decision theory may favor the one-box solution in Newcomb's problem, and may recommend against making cost-free observations. But if one can control one's future choices, then causal decision theory never recommends against cost-free observation
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DOI 10.1086/289569
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Patrick Maher (1995). Probabilities for New Theories. Philosophical Studies 77 (1):103 - 115.

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