The concept of inductive probability

Erkenntnis 65 (2):185 - 206 (2006)
The word ‘probability’ in ordinary language has two different senses, here called inductive and physical probability. This paper examines the concept of inductive probability. Attempts to express this concept in other words are shown to be either incorrect or else trivial. In particular, inductive probability is not the same as degree of belief. It is argued that inductive probabilities exist; subjectivist arguments to the contrary are rebutted. Finally, it is argued that inductive probability is an important concept and that it is a mistake to try to replace it with the concept of degree of belief, as is usual today.
Keywords Philosophy   Logic   Ethics   Ontology   Epistemology   Philosophy
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 22,570
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Ian Hacking (1995). The Emergence of Probability. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.

View all 15 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Patrick Maher (2010). Explication of Inductive Probability. Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (6):593 - 616.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

110 ( #38,167 of 1,938,443 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

13 ( #41,426 of 1,938,443 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.