Assertion, knowledge, and action

Philosophical Studies 149 (1):99 - 118 (2010)
We argue against the knowledge rule of assertion, and in favour of integrating the account of assertion more tightly with our best theories of evidence and action. We think that the knowledge rule has an incredible consequence when it comes to practical deliberation, that it can be right for a person to do something that she can't properly assert she can do. We develop some vignettes that show how this is possible, and how odd this consequence is. We then argue that these vignettes point towards alternate rules that tie assertion to sufficient evidence-responsiveness or to proper action. These rules have many of the virtues that are commonly claimed for the knowledge rule, but lack the knowledge rule's problematic consequences when it comes to assertions about what to do
Keywords Assertion  Knowledge  Evidence  Action  Luminosity  Moore’s paradox
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DOI 10.2307/40606344
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1996). Elusive Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Keith DeRose (2002). Assertion, Knowledge, and Context. Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.

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Citations of this work BETA
Peter Pagin (2015). Problems with Norms of Assertion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2).
Brian Ball (2014). The Knowledge Rule and the Action Rule. Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (4):552-574.

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