David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 149 (1):99-118 (2010)
We argue against the knowledge rule of assertion, and in favour of integrating the account of assertion more tightly with our best theories of evidence and action. We think that the knowledge rule has an incredible consequence when it comes to practical deliberation, that it can be right for a person to do something that she can't properly assert she can do. We develop some vignettes that show how this is possible, and how odd this consequence is. We then argue that these vignettes point towards alternate rules that tie assertion to sufficient evidence-responsiveness or to proper action. These rules have many of the virtues that are commonly claimed for the knowledge rule, but lack the knowledge rule's problematic consequences when it comes to assertions about what to do.
|Keywords||Assertion Knowledge Evidence Action Luminosity Moore’s paradox|
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References found in this work BETA
Jason Stanley (2005). Knowledge and Practical Interests. Oxford University Press.
John Hawthorne (2003). Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford University Press.
David Lewis (1996). Elusive Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Keith DeRose (2002). Assertion, Knowledge, and Context. Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
Igor Douven (2006). Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility. Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.
Citations of this work BETA
Mikkel Gerken (2014). Same, Same but Different: The Epistemic Norms of Assertion, Action and Practical Reasoning. Philosophical Studies 168 (3):725-744.
Neil Mehta (2015). Knowledge and Other Norms for Assertion, Action, and Belief: A Teleological Account. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1).
Peter Pagin (2015). Problems with Norms of Assertion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1).
John N. Williams (2015). Moore's Paradox in Thought: A Critical Survey. Philosophy Compass 10 (1):24-37.
Brian Ball (2014). The Knowledge Rule and the Action Rule. Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (4):552-574.
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