Review of Richard Holton, Willing, Wanting, Waiting

Abstract Theories of the will may be usefully divided into three kinds. The reductivist about the will tells us that volitional states such as intention may be reduced to states that are not themselves intrinsically volitional, notably beliefs and desires. The non-naturalist about the will rejects any such reduction, and indeed argues that accommodating claims about the will requires us to reject hypotheses that seem open to confirmation by future physics, notably determinism. The tempting but elusive middle ground between these two views may be called non-reductive naturalism about the will. On such a view, volitional states must be taken as basic and irreducible, but are not such that we cannot find room for them in the world as it may be disclosed to us by science.
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