Death and destruction in Spinoza's ethics
Inquiry 20 (1-4):403 – 417 (1977)
| Abstract | An exposition of Spinoza's views of the cause and cure of death. He holds death to be disruption of mind/body which need not involve becoming a corpse; amnesia counts. It follows that his criterion of personal identity includes memory, so Spinozistic immortality is impersonal. The cause of death is always something external, for nothing can destroy itself. (This principle, however, is not universally true; Spinoza was led to it by mistaken physics.) Suicide is irrational. Fear of death is to be overcome by realization that since adequate ideas are eternal, to the extent that they consitute our minds we are eternal also. (But if so, isn't suicide rational after all? And since language depends on memory, the eternal understanding of adequate ideas is non-linguistic and non-symbolic; what then can it be?). | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,672 |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Configure |
Douglas N. Walton (1981). Epistemology of Brain Death Determination. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 2 (3):259-274.
J. F. Humphrey (2009). “There is Good Hope That Death is a Blessing”. In Dennis Cooley & Lloyd Steffen (eds.), Innovative Dialogue. Probing the Boundaries: Re-Imagining Death and Dying. Interdisciplinary Press.
Steven Luper (2009). The Philosophy of Death. Cambridge University Press.
Benedictus de Spinoza (1989). Ethics. C.E. Tuttle.
Mary Warnock (2008). Easeful Death: Is There a Case for Assisted Dying? Oxford University Press.
Ari Joffe (2010). Are Recent Defences of the Brain Death Concept Adequate? Bioethics 24 (2):47-53.
Shelly Kagan (2012). Death. Yale University Press.
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-03-05Total downloads32 ( #37,900 of 549,066 )Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,703 of 549,066 )How can I increase my downloads? |

