David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy Compass 5 (11):999-1012 (2010)
In empirically minded research, it is widely agreed that emotions play an important, even essential, role in moral judgment. Experimental research on moral development, psychopathology, helping behavior, moral judgment, and moral justification has been used to support different new forms of sentimentalism. This article reviews this evidence critically and proposes that although it suggests that emotions play a role in moral judgment, it does so in a more limited way than is often assumed to be the case. Some evidence shows merely that emotions play a role in decision-making, other that emotions are implicated in certain types of moral judgment. What is required, it seems, is a new conceptualization of what is at stake in the rationalism versus sentimentalism debate.
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References found in this work BETA
Christine M. Korsgaard (1996). The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge University Press.
Marc Hauser (2006). Moral Minds: How Nature Designed Our Universal Sense of Right and Wrong. Harper Collins.
Jesse J. Prinz (2004). Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of the Emotions. Oxford University Press.
Jesse J. Prinz (2007). The Emotional Construction of Morals. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Joshua May (2014). Moral Judgment and Deontology: Empirical Developments. Philosophy Compass 9 (11):745-755.
Hanno Sauer (2011). Social Intuitionism and the Psychology of Moral Reasoning. Philosophy Compass 6 (10):708-721.
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