David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (3):279 - 293 (2008)
The paper is a critical examination of the metaethical position taken up recently by Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons, called ‘cognitivist expressivism’. The key component of the position is their insistence that some beliefs are nondescriptive. The paper argues against this thesis in two ways: First by sketching an independently plausible account of belief, on which belief is essentially a certain kind of descriptive representational state; and second by rebutting Horgan and Timmons’ positive arguments in favor of their account. The final section argues that Horgan and Timmons’ view cannot survive abandonment of the thesis that moral beliefs are nondescriptive in character.
|Keywords||Expressivism Belief Representation Metaethics Cognitivism Motivation Phenomenology Direction of fit|
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References found in this work BETA
Russ Shafer-Landau (2003/2005). Moral Realism: A Defence. Oxford University Press.
Allan Gibbard (2003). Thinking How to Live. Harvard University Press.
David Owen Brink (1989). Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
Simon Blackburn (1998/2000). Ruling Passions. Oxford University Press.
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