Function, intuition and ends in Aristotle's ethics

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (2):187 - 200 (2006)
This essay attempts to show why deliberation is not of ends for Aristotle, not only because deliberation is concerned with means, but because ends are grasped by wish. Such wishing, I argue, is a form of rational intuition that is non-discursive and analogous to seeing and therefore not at all like the discursive thought involved in deliberation. Such a reading also helps shed light on the nature of contemplation and therefore on happiness in Aristotle.
Keywords Aristotle   Nicomachean Ethics  deliberation  wish  intuition  function  ends  contemplation
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DOI 10.2307/27504396
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References found in this work BETA
Alfred R. Mele (1981). Choice and Virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics. Journal of the History of Philosophy 19 (4):405-423.

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