Input/output logics

Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (4):383-408 (2000)
In a range of contexts, one comes across processes resembling inference, but where input propositions are not in general included among outputs, and the operation is not in any way reversible. Examples arise in contexts of conditional obligations, goals, ideals, preferences, actions, and beliefs. Our purpose is to develop a theory of such input/output operations. Four are singled out: simple-minded, basic (making intelligent use of disjunctive inputs), simple-minded reusable (in which outputs may be recycled as inputs), and basic reusable. They are defined semantically and characterised by derivation rules, as well as in terms of relabeling procedures and modal operators. Their behaviour is studied on both semantic and syntactic levels.
Keywords input/output logic  reusability  identity  conditional goals  conditional obligations  deontic logic
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DOI 10.1023/A:1004748624537
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References found in this work BETA
Ray Reiter (1980). A Logic for Default Reasoning. Artificial Intelligence 13:81-137.

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Jörg Hansen (2006). Deontic Logics for Prioritized Imperatives. Artificial Intelligence and Law 14 (1-2):1-34.

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