David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 155 (1):117-131 (2011)
Representation is central to contemporary theorizing about the mind/brain. But the nature of representation--both in the mind/brain and more generally--is a source of ongoing controversy. One way of categorizing representational types is to distinguish between the analog and the digital: the received view is that analog representations vary smoothly, while digital representations vary in a step-wise manner. I argue that this characterization is inadequate to account for the ways in which representation is used in cognitive science; in its place, I suggest an alternative taxonomy. I will defend and extend David Lewis's account of analog and digital representation, distinguishing analog from continuous representation, as well as digital from discrete representation. I will argue that the distinctions available in this four-fold account accord with representational features of theoretical interest in cognitive science more usefully than the received analog/digital dichotomy.
|Keywords||Analog Digital Representation Cognitive science|
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References found in this work BETA
Nelson Goodman (1968). Languages of Art. Bobbs-Merrill.
Gualtiero Piccinini (2007). Computing Mechanisms. Philosophy of Science 74 (4):501-526.
Gualtiero Piccinini (2008). Computers. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):32–73.
David Lewis (1971). Analog and Digital. Noûs 5 (3):321-327.
Citations of this work BETA
Gualtiero Piccinini & Sonya Bahar (2013). Neural Computation and the Computational Theory of Cognition. Cognitive Science 37 (3):453-488.
Nir Fresco & Phillip J. Staines (2014). A Revised Attack on Computational Ontology. Minds and Machines 24 (1):101-122.
Aldo Frigerio, Alessandro Giordani & Luca Mari (2013). On Representing Information: A Characterization of the Analog/Digital Distinction. Dialectica 67 (4):455-483.
Whit Schonbein (2014). Varieties of Analog and Digital Representation. Minds and Machines 24 (4):415-438.
John Kulvicki (2015). Analog Representation and the Parts Principle. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (1):165-180.
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