Online research in philosophy

Although epistemic possibility figures in several debates, those debates have had relatively little contact with one another. G. E. Moore focused squarely upon analyzing epistemic uses of the phrase, ‘It’s possible that p’, and in doing so he made two fundamental assumptions. First, he assumed that epistemic possibility statements always express the epistemic position of a community, as opposed to that of an individual speaker. Second, he assumed that all epistemic uses of ‘It’s possible that p’ are analyzable in terms of knowledge, not belief. A number of later theorists, including Keith DeRose, provide alternative accounts of epistemic possibility, while retaining Moore’s two assumptions. Neither assumption has been explicitly challenged, but Jaakko Hintikka’s analysis provides a basis for doing so. Drawing upon Hintikka’s analysis, I argue that some epistemic possibility statements express only the speaker’s individual epistemic state, and that contra DeRose, they are not degenerate community statements but a class in their own right. I further argue that some linguistic contexts are belief- rather than knowledge-based, and in such contexts, what is possible for a speaker depends not upon what she knows, but upon what she believes.

To what extent and how is conceivability a guide to possibility? This essay explores general philosophical issues raised by this question, and critically surveys responses to it by Descartes, Hume, Kripke and "two-dimensionalists.".

I investigate two asymmetrical approaches to knowledge of absolute possibility and of necessity-one which treats knowledge of possibility as more fundamental, the other according epistemological priority to necessity. Two necessary conditions for the success of an asymmetrical approach are proposed. I argue that a possibility-based approach seems unable to meet my second condition, but that on certain assumptions-including, pivotally, the assumption that logical and conceptual necessities, while absolute, do not exhaust the class of absolute necessities-a necessity-based approach may be able to do so.

This book explores the ways deconstruction addresses the issue of futurity (what Jacques Derrida calls the "to-come," [l'à-venir]). In order to achieve this, it focuses on three French expressions, venue, survenue, and voir-venir, each taken from the work of Jacques Derrida, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Catherine Malabou. The idea behind this focus is to elude the issue of the one and only "to-come," as if this was a uniform and coherent entity or structure of experience, and to put forward instead the possibility of a multiplicity of structures, each with a different intonation or pitch. Overall, this book makes an original contribution to the way deconstruction addresses the issue of futurity in the act of writing and translation.

The purpose of this article is to show that Piaget's use of the equilibrium principle cannot explain the possibility of correct understanding. That is, it cannot explain the possibility of knowledge, as opposed to simple change in belief. To make the argument, I begin by describing Piaget's explanatory model, which is known as the equilibrium principle. I then argue that correct understanding, or knowledge of any x as a case of y, requires a concept of correctness, i.e., the recognition that words and concepts apply under some conditions but not others. I try to show that because he uses the equilibrium principle as a basis for his explanation, Piaget cannot explain how a concept of correctness is acquired. Finally, I argue that to explain the possibility of knowledge, one must show how the conditions for word and concept application are determined by a community of language users. Again, I claim that Piaget's use of the equilibrium model precludes such an account.

Endorsing the idea of group knowledge seems to entail the possibility of group belief as well, because it is usually held that knowledge entails belief. It is here studied whether it would be possible to grant that groups can have knowledge without being committed to the controversial view that groups can have beliefs. The answer is positive on the assumption that knowledge can be based on acceptance as well as belief. The distinction between belief and acceptance can be seen as a refinement of the ordinary language concept of belief, and it may be useful in understanding the nature of epistemic justification and classifying various types of epistemic subjects.

C. Theses: 1. Content Externalism strictly implies the possibility of acquiring a new concept as the result of an unwitting switch of environments. 2. This intuitively compels us to accept the possibility of someone possessing a concept without being aware that she does. 3. This possibility strictly favors causal models of meta-cognition over constitution models. 4. The possibility of possessing a concept unawares suggests that the contents of metacognitive.

I investigate two asymmetrical approaches to knowledge of absolute possibility and of necessity--one which treats knowledge of possibility as more fundamental, the other according epistemological priority to necessity. Two necessary conditions for the success of an asymmetrical approach are proposed. I argue that a possibility-based approach seems unable to meet my second condition, but that on certain assumptions--including, pivotally, the assumption that logical and conceptual necessities, while absolute, do not exhaust the class of absolute necessities--a necessity-based approach may be able to do so.

Jacques Derrida's lecture entitled "How to Avoid Speaking: Denials", given in Jerusalem in 1986, responds both to those who subsume his project within negative theology and to those that ignore their interrelation. The former fail to see that while negative theology is oriented towards ineffable union with the divine, deconstruction radically denies the possibility of this union. The latter, however, read negative theology solely in the context of this ineffable union, ignoring the possibility of a second apophatic language whose critique of language is itself so radical that it engages in a paradoxcical self-critique that denies, if not union itself, at least the possibility of speaking about union. This second, concurrent language has a distinct family resemblance to Derrida's own deconstructive project, for it embraces the radically negative denials of differance. This study will first present a critique of those who offer either an affirmative or negative answer to the question "Is deconstruction a form of negative theology?", arguing instead that Derrida denies all answers. Its final step will analyze the similarities between negative theology's escape from the silence of pure denial--prayer--and Derrida's own means of escaping the silence summoned when he asks: "How to avoid speaking?".

“Faith” is a central theme in Karl Rahner’s theology. While Rahner dealt at length with what classical theology names fides qua and fides quae, discussion of the context in which people came to faith was also crucial to his exposition of the Christian life. This paper has three aims: to examine Rahner’s understanding of the relationship between context and the possibility of faith; to outline and evaluate Rahner’s assessment of the ways in which people might appropriate and articulate Christian faith in the modern world; and to explore whether Rahner’s approach to faith still offers a resource that the contemporary church might receive in a context that raises questions beyond those that confronted Rahner.