Differences between interpersonal and intrapersonal belief ascription: A problem with Block's argument for holism
|Abstract||instead he argues for a conditional: "if there is such a thing as narrow content, it is holistic," where holism is taken to be "the doctrine that any _substantial_ difference in W-beliefs, whether between two people or between one person at two times, requires a difference in the meaning or content of W" (153, 152)|
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