David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In [Book Chapter] (in Press) (2003)
The human ability to represent, conceptualize, and reason about mind and behavior is one of the greatest achievements of human evolution and is made possible by a “folk theory of mind” — a sophisticated conceptual framework that relates different mental states to each other and connects them to behavior. This chapter examines the nature and elements of this framework and its central functions for social cognition. As a conceptual framework, the folk theory of mind operates prior to any particular conscious or unconscious cognition and provides the “framing” or interpretation of that cognition. Central to this framing is the concept of intentionality, which distinguishes intentional action (caused by the agent’s intention and decision) from unintentional behavior (caused by internal or external events without the intervention of the agent’s decision). A second important distinction separates publicly observable from publicly unobservable (i.e., mental) events. Together, the two distinctions define the kinds of events in social interaction that people attend to, wonder about, and try to explain. A special focus of this chapter is the powerful tool of behavior explanation, which relies on the folk theory of mind but is also intimately tied to social demands and to the perceiver’s social goals. A full understanding of social cognition must consider the folk theory of mind as the conceptual underpinning of all (conscious and unconscious) perception and thinking about the social world.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Scott M. Christensen & Dale R. Turner (eds.) (1993). Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind. L. Erlbaum.
Bertram F. Malle (2006). Of Windmills and Straw Men: Folk Assumptions of Mind and Action. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press 207-231.
Mitchell Herschbach (2008). Folk Psychological and Phenomenological Accounts of Social Perception. Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):223 – 235.
Karsten R. Stueber (2012). Varieties of Empathy, Neuroscience and the Narrative Challenge to the Contemporary Theory of Mind Debate. Emotion Revies 4 (1):55-63.
Ian Ravenscroft, Folk Psychology as a Theory. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Bertram F. Malle (2004). How the Mind Explains Behavior: Folk Explanations, Meaning, and Social Interaction. MIT Press.
Bertram F. Malle (2005). Folk Theory of Mind: Conceptual Foundations of Human Social Cognition. In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford Series in Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience. Oxford University Press 225-255.
G. Fletcher (1995). Two Uses of Folk Psychology: Implications for Psychological Science. Philosophical Psychology 8 (3):375-88.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads43 ( #96,187 of 1,902,049 )
Recent downloads (6 months)10 ( #73,963 of 1,902,049 )
How can I increase my downloads?