David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy of Science 57 (September):445-58 (1990)
An account of the contents of the propositional attitudes is fundamental to the success of the cognitive sciences if, as seems correct, the cognitive sciences do presuppose propositional attitudes. Fodor has recently pointed the way towards a naturalistic explication of mental content in his Psychosemantics (1987). Fodor's theory is a version of the causal theory of meaning and thus inherits many of its virtues, including its intrinsic plausibility. Nevertheless, the proposal may suffer from two deficiencies: (1) It seems not to provide an adequate explanation of misrepresentation. (2) It may also fail, as a species of empiricism, to provide a correct explication of the content of observational concepts and those non-observational concepts whose meaning is to be traced to their causal connections with observational concepts
|Keywords||Cognitive Science Mental Process Propositional Attitudes Science Fodor, J|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Joseph Mendola (2003). A Dilemma for Asymmetric Dependence. Noûs 37 (2):232-257.
Ted A. Warfield (1994). Fodorian Semantics: A Reply to Adams and Aizawa. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 4 (2):205-14.
Similar books and articles
J. Christopher Maloney (1994). Content: Covariation, Control, and Contingency. Synthese 100 (2):241-90.
Radu J. Bogdan (1989). Does Semantics Run the Psyche? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (June):687-700.
Murat Aydede (2000). On the Type/Token Relation of Mental Representations. Facta Philosophica 2 (1):23-50.
Sørenarnow H. Klausen (2008). The Phenomenology of Propositional Attitudes. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4).
A. Goldman (1993). The Psychology of Folk Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2008). Against Essential Normativity of the Mental. Philosophical Studies 140 (2):263 - 283.
Jonathan Knowles (2001). Does Intentional Psychology Need Vindicating by Cognitive Science? Minds and Machines 11 (3):347-377.
Leonardo Caffo (2011). Predict the Behavior: Propositional Attitudes and Philosophy of Action. Dialettica and Filosofia (2011):1-8.
Tyler Burge (1982). Two Thought Experiments Reviewed. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (July):284-94.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads34 ( #59,578 of 1,410,532 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #76,382 of 1,410,532 )
How can I increase my downloads?