Searle on first person meaning and indeterminacy
Theoria 54 (1):25-30 (1988)
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| Keywords | Content Indeterminacy Intentionality Language Searle, J | |||||||||
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John R. Searle (2002). Consciousness and Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jerome C. Wakefield (2003). The Chinese Room Argument Reconsidered: Essentialism, Indeterminacy, and Strong AI. Minds and Machines 13 (2):285-319.
Amir Horowitz (1995). Putnam, Searle, and Externalism. Philosophical Studies 81 (1):27-69.
John R. Searle (1987). Indeterminacy, Empiricism, and the First Person. Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):123-146.
Audun Ofsti (1994). Searle, Leibniz and 'the First Person': A Note on the Epilogue of Intentionality. In Analyomen 1. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.
Günter Abel (1994). Indeterminacy and Interpretation. Inquiry 37 (4):403 – 419.
Mikhail Kissine (2011). Misleading Appearances: Searle on Assertion and Meaning. Erkenntnis 74 (1):115-129.
Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.) (2007). John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning, and Mind. Cambridge University Press.
John R. Searle (1984). Indeterminacy, Empiricism, and the First Person. Journal of Philosophy 81 (March):123-146.
Karsten R. Stueber (1996). Indeterminacy and the First Person Perspective. In C. Martinez Vidal (ed.), Verdad: Logica, Representacion Y Mundo. Universidade de Santiago de Compostela.
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