Why We Should Do Without Concepts

Mind and Language 25 (5):622-633 (2010)
Machery (2009) has proposed that the notion of ‘concept’ ought to be eliminated from the theoretical vocabulary of psychology. I raise three questions about his argument: (1) Is there a meaningful distinction between concepts and background knowledge? (2) Do we need to discard the hybrid view? (3) Are there really categories of things in the world that are the basis for concepts? Although I argue that the answer to all three is ‘no’, I agree with Machery's conclusion that seeking a single characterization of concepts will not be fruitful for understanding cognitive representations and processes
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01405.x
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Collin Rice (2014). Concepts as Pluralistic Hybrids. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):n/a-n/a.

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