Modules and mindreaders

Biology and Philosophy 16 (3):377-93 (2002)
There are many interesting empirical and theoretical issues concerning the evolution of cognition. Despite this, recent books on the topic concentrate on two problems. One is mental modularity. The other is what distinguishes human from non-human minds. While it is easy to understand why people are interested in human uniqueness, it is not clear why modularity is the centre of attention. Fodor (2000) has a nice argument for why people _should_ be interested in modularity
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy of Biology   Evolutionary Biology
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DOI 10.1023/A:1010605410437
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