David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Psychology 4 (3):375-82 (1991)
Abstract I first suggest some ways in which the externalist account of psychological content can be reconciled with the aspectual character of intentionality. I then give an argument against the externalist account which includes as premises the claims that a system capable of having intentional states must understand a language, and that a system that understands a language must be capable of consciousness. I defend the latter claim by arguing that a correct understanding of observation sentences requires conscious, sensory experience, and by appealing to the fact that language has meaning in a holistic manner
|Keywords||Consciousness Externalism Intentionality Psychology Science|
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References found in this work BETA
Donald Davidson (1984). Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation. Oxford University Press.
Donald Davidson (1987). Knowing One's Own Mind. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3):441-458.
Daniel C. Dennett (1978). Brainstorms. MIT Press.
John Haugeland (ed.) (1981). Mind Design. MIT Press.
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