David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Alessio Plebe & Vivian De La Cruz (eds.), Philosophy in the Neuroscience Era. Squilibri (2008)
This article tackles problems concerning the reduction of phenomenal consciousness to brain processes that arise in consideration of specifically epistemological properties that have been attributed to conscious experiences. In particular, various defenders of dualism and epiphenomenalism have argued for their positions by assuming special epistemic access to phenomenal consciousness. Many physicalists have reacted to such arguments by denying the epistemological premises. My aim in this paper is to take a different approach in opposing dualism and argue that when we correctly examine both the phenomenology and neural correlates of phenomenal consciousness we will see that granting the epistemological premises of special access are the best hope for a scientific study of consciousness. I argue that essential features of consciousness involve both their knowability by the subject of experience as well as their egocentricity, that is, their knowability by the subject as belonging to the subject. I articulate a neuroscientifically informed theory of phenomenal consciousness
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Pete Mandik (2012). Color-Consciousness Conceptualism. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):617-631.
Pete Mandik (2010). Control Consciousness. Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (4):643-657.
Josh Weisberg (2011). The Zombie's Cogito: Meditations on Type-Q Materialism. Philosophical Psychology 24 (5):585 - 605.
Similar books and articles
Antonino Raffone & Martina Pantani (2010). A Global Workspace Model for Phenomenal and Access Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2):580-596.
Dmitry Ivanov (2009). Phenomenal Consciousness. Analytica 3:19-36.
Adam Rock & Stanley Krippner (2007). Does the Concept of “Altered States of Consciousness” Rest on a Mistake? International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 26:33-40.
Lisa McLellan, Can We Provide a Plausible Evolutionary Account of the Emergence of Phenomenal Consciousness?
J. Kevin O'Regan & Erik Myin (2007). Phenomenal Consciousness Lite: No Thanks! Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):520-521.
Gualtiero Piccinini (2007). The Ontology of Creature Consciousness: A Challenge for Philosophy. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):103-104.
Uriah Kriegel (2006). Theories of Consciousness. Philosophy Compass 1 (1):58-64.
Andreas Elpidorou, Phenomenal Concepts. Oxford Bibliographies Online.
Uriah Kriegel (2007). Consciousness: Phenomenal Consciousness, Access Consciousness, and Scientific Practice. In Paul R. Thagard (ed.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science. Elsevier
William Fish (2008). Relationalism and the Problems of Consciousness. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):167-80.
Chuck Stieg (2009). Is Phenomenal Consciousness a Complex Structure? Cogprints 51 (4):152-61.
Austen Clark (2001). Phenomenal Consciousness so-Called. In Werner Backhaus (ed.), Neuronal Coding of Perceptual Systems. World Scientific
Elizabeth Irvine (2009). Signal Detection Theory, the Exclusion Failure Paradigm and Weak Consciousness—Evidence for the Access/Phenomenal Distinction? Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2):551-560.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads319 ( #3,021 of 1,727,257 )
Recent downloads (6 months)225 ( #2,244 of 1,727,257 )
How can I increase my downloads?