David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 190 (17):3865-3888 (2013)
I argue for the view that there are important similarities between knowledge and acting for a normative reason. I interpret acting for a normative reason in terms of Sosa’s notion of an apt performance. Actions that are done for a normative reason are normatively apt actions. They are in accordance with a normative reason because of a competence to act in accordance with normative reasons. I argue that, if Sosa’s account of knowledge as apt belief is correct, this means that acting for a normative reason is in many respects similar to knowledge. In order to strengthen Sosa’s account of knowledge, I propose to supplement it with an appeal to sub-competences. This clarifies how this account can deal with certain Gettier cases, and it helps to understand how exactly acting for a normative reason is similar to apt belief
|Keywords||Acting for reasons Acting for a normative reason Gettier problem Knowledge Apt belief Normative reasons Explanation Competence Virtue epistemology Apt action|
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References found in this work BETA
Linda Zagzebski (1996). Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry Into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
John Greco (2010). Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity. Cambridge University Press.
Duncan Pritchard (2010). The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations. Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Clayton Littlejohn (2015). Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle About Rationality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):n/a-n/a.
Bob Beddor (2015). Evidentialism, Circularity, and Grounding. Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1847-1868.
Susanne Mantel (2015). Worldly Reasons: An Ontological Inquiry Into Motivating Considerations and Normative Reasons. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):n/a-n/a.
Susanne Mantel (2014). No Reason for Identity: On the Relation Between Motivating and Normative Reasons. Philosophical Explorations 17 (1):49-62.
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