A gradable approach to dispositions

Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):68–75 (2007)
Previous theories of the relationship between dispositions and conditionals are unable to account for the fact that dispositions come in degrees. We propose a fix for this problem that has the added benefit of avoiding the classic problems of finks and masks.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.469.x
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1979). Scorekeeping in a Language Game. Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359.
David Lewis (1997). Finkish Dispositions. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):143-158.
Mark Johnston (1992). How to Speak of the Colors. Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.
C. B. Martin (1994). Dispositions and Conditionals. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):1-8.
Alexander Bird (1998). Dispositions and Antidotes. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):227-234.

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Citations of this work BETA
Jesse R. Steinberg (2010). Dispositions and Subjunctives. Philosophical Studies 148 (3):323 - 341.
David Manley (2012). Dispositionality: Beyond The Biconditionals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):321 - 334.

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