David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Theory and Decision 71 (2):195-210 (2011)
This article concerns the prescriptive function of decision analysis. Consider an agent who must choose an action yielding welfare that varies with an unknown state of nature. It is often asserted that such an agent should adhere to consistency axioms which imply that behavior can be represented as maximization of expected utility. However, our agent is not concerned the consistency of his behavior across hypothetical choice sets. He only wants to make a reasonable choice from the choice set that he actually faces. Hence, I reason that prescriptions for decision making should respect actuality. That is, they should promote welfare maximization in the choice problem the agent actually faces. Any choice respecting weak and stochastic dominance is rational from the actualist perspective.
|Keywords||Prescriptive decision analysis Decisions with partial knowledge Respect for dominance Consequentialism|
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References found in this work BETA
Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.) (1982). Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press.
Leonard J. Savage (1954). The Foundations of Statistics. Wiley Publications in Statistics.
Ken Binmore (2011). Rational Decisions. Princeton University Press.
Charles F. Manski (1988). Ordinal Utility Models of Decision Making Under Uncertainty. Theory and Decision 25 (1):79-104.
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