Color-Consciousness Conceptualism

Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):617-631 (2012)
Abstract
The goal of the present paper is to defend against a certain line of attack the view that conscious experience of <span class='Hi'>color</span> is no more fine-grained that the repertoire of non- demonstrative concepts that a perceiver is able to bring to bear in perception. The line of attack in question is an alleged empirical argument - the Diachronic Indistinguishability Argument (DIA) - based on pairs of colors so similar that they can be discriminated when simultaneously presented but not when presented across a memory delay. My aim here is to show that this argument fails.
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References found in this work BETA
Jose Luis Bermudez, Nonconceptual Mental Content. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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Citations of this work BETA
David Pereplyotchik (2011). Why Believe in Demonstrative Concepts? Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):636-638.
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