David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):617-631 (2012)
The goal of the present paper is to defend against a certain line of attack the view that conscious experience of color is no more fine-grained that the repertoire of non- demonstrative concepts that a perceiver is able to bring to bear in perception. The line of attack in question is an alleged empirical argument - the Diachronic Indistinguishability Argument - based on pairs of colors so similar that they can be discriminated when simultaneously presented but not when presented across a memory delay. My aim here is to show that this argument fails
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References found in this work BETA
Richard Heck (2000). Nonconceptual Content and the "Space of Reasons". Philosophical Review 109 (4):483-523.
Christopher Peacocke (2001). Does Perception Have a Nonconceptual Content? Journal of Philosophy 98 (5):239-264.
Uriah Kriegel (2003). Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an Argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):103-132.
Martin Davies (1992). Perceptual Content and Local Supervenience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66:21-45.
Sean D. Kelly (2001). Demonstrative Concepts and Experience. Philosophical Review 110 (3):397-420.
Citations of this work BETA
Jacob Berger (2015). The Sensory Content of Perceptual Experience. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):446-468.
David Roden (2013). NATURE's DARK DOMAIN: AN ARGUMENT FOR A NATURALIZED PHENOMENOLOGY. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 72 (1):169-88.
Jacob Berger (2012). Do We Conceptualize Every Color We Consciously Discriminate? Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):632-635.
David Pereplyotchik (2011). Why Believe in Demonstrative Concepts? Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):636-638.
Jake Quilty‐Dunn (2015). Believing in Perceiving: Known Illusions and the Classical Dual‐Component Theory. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):550-575.
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