David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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History and Philosophy of Logic 19 (2):63-81 (1998)
This paper argues for a conditional claim concerning a famous argument?developed by Church in elucidation of some remarks by Frege to the effect that the bedeutung of a sentence is the sentence?s truth-value?the Frege?Gödel?Church argument, or FGC for short. The point we make is this :if, and just to the extent that, Arthur Smullyan?s argument against Quine's use of FGC is sound, then essentially the same rejoinder disposes also of Davidson's use of FGC against ?correspondence? theories of truth. We thus dispute a contention by Professor Davidson that it is coherent to accept that Smullyan?s rejoinder takes away the force of Quine?s version of FGC, while still consistently using FGC to establish that if true sentences (or utterances) correspond to anything, they all correspond to the same thing. We show that the differences between the cases discussed by Smullyan and Davidson?s version of FGC on which Davidson relies for his contention are irrelevant to the point under dispute
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References found in this work BETA
Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.) (1989). Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press, Usa.
W. V. Quine (1960). Word and Object. The MIT Press.
Gareth Evans (1982). Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press.
Michael A. E. Dummett (1978). Truth and Other Enigmas. Harvard University Press.
W. V. Quine (1953/1980). From a Logical Point of View. Harvard University Press.
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