Effect of counterfactual and factual thinking on causal judgements
Thinking and Reasoning 9 (3):245 – 265 (2003)
| Abstract | The significance of counterfactual thinking in the causal judgement process has been emphasized for nearly two decades, yet no previous research has directly compared the relative effect of thinking counterfactually versus factually on causal judgement. Three experiments examined this comparison by manipulating the task frame used to focus participants' thinking about a target event. Prior to making judgements about causality, preventability, blame, and control, participants were directed to think about a target actor either in counterfactual terms (what the actor could have done to change the outcome) or in factual terms (what the actor had done that led to the outcome). In each experiment, the effect of counterfactual thinking did not differ reliably from the effect of factual thinking on causal judgement. Implications for research on causal judgement and mental representation are discussed. | |||||||||
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Jim Bogen (2004). Analysing Causality: The Opposite of Counterfactual is Factual. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18 (1):3 – 26.
David R. Mandel (2005). Counterfactual and Causal Explanation: From Early Theoretical Views to New Frontiers. In David R. Mandel, Denis J. Hilton & Patrizia Catellani (eds.), The Psychology of Counterfactual Thinking. Routledge.
Karl Halvor Teigen (1998). When the Unreal is More Likely Than the Real: Post Hoc Probability Judgements and Counterfactual Closeness. Thinking and Reasoning 4 (2):147 – 177.
Herbert A. Simon & Nicholas Rescher (1966). Cause and Counterfactual. Philosophy of Science 33 (4):323-340.
Sarah L. Gorniak, Kevin J. Riggs & Sarah R. Beck (2011). Relating Developments in Children's Counterfactual Thinking and Executive Functions. Thinking and Reasoning 15 (4):337-354.
Sarah L. Gorniak, Kevin J. Riggs & Sarah R. Beck (2011). Relating Developments in Children's Counterfactual Thinking and Executive Functions. Thinking and Reasoning 15 (4):337-354.
Alice McEleney & Ruth M. J. Byrne (2006). Spontaneous Counterfactual Thoughts and Causal Explanations. Thinking and Reasoning 12 (2):235 – 255.
Marc J. Buehner & Jon May (2002). Knowledge Mediates the Timeframe of Covariation Assessment in Human Causal Induction. Thinking and Reasoning 8 (4):269 – 295.
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