David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Mind and Language 27 (2):181-199 (2012)
Some self-ascriptions of belief, desire and other attitudes exhibit first-person authority. The aim here is to offer a novel account of this kind of first-person authority. The account is a development of Robert Gordon's ascent routine theory but is framed in terms of our ability to bring it about that others know of our attitudes via speech acts which do not deploy attitudinal vocabulary but which nonetheless ‘show’ our attitudes to others. Unlike Gordon's ascent routine theory, the theory readily applies to attitudes other than belief, avoids a need to appeal to processes of making up one's mind, and does not rest upon a distinction between ‘outward looking’ and ‘inward looking’ processes
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Jonathan E. Adler (1997). Lying, Deceiving, or Falsely Implicating. Journal of Philosophy 94 (9):435-452.
Dorit Bar-On (2004). Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
Dorit Bar-On & Douglas C. Long (2001). Avowals and First-Person Privilege. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):311-35.
Donald Davidson (1984). First Person Authority. Dialectica 38 (2‐3):101-112.
Donald Davidson (1987). Knowing One's Own Mind. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3):441-458.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Krista Lawlor (2003). Elusive Reasons: A Problem for First-Person Authority. Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):549-565.
Sanford C. Goldberg (2002). Belief and its Linguistic Expression: Toward a Belief Box Account of First-Person Authority. Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):65-76.
Raphael Woolf (2008). Socratic Authority. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 90 (1):1-38.
Rockney Jacobsen (2009). Davidson and First-Person Authority: Parataxis and Self-Expression. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):251-266.
Luca Ferrero (2003). An Elusive Challenge to the Authorship Account: Commentary on Lawlor's "Elusive Reasons". Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):565 – 577.
Friederike Moltmann (2012). Two Kinds of First-Person-Oriented Content. Synthese 184 (2):157 - 177.
Richard A. Moran (1999). The Authority of Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):174-200.
Robert M. Gordon (2007). Ascent Routines for Propositional Attitudes. Synthese 159 (2):151 - 165.
Mark McCullagh (2002). Self-Knowledge Failures and First Person Authority. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):365-380.
Taylor Carman (2003). First Persons: On Richard Moran's Authority and Estrangement. Inquiry 46 (3):395 – 408.
Lynne Rudder Baker (2007). Social Externalism and First-Person Authority. Erkenntnis 67 (2):287 - 300.
Scott Hershovitz (2011). The Role of Authority. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (7).
Jane Heal (2002). The Presidential Address: On First-Person Authority. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102:1 - 19.
Stephen L. Darwall (2006). The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability. Harvard University Press.
Added to index2012-03-27
Total downloads13 ( #122,800 of 1,102,968 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #297,509 of 1,102,968 )
How can I increase my downloads?