Graduate studies at Western
History and Philosophy of Logic 29 (3):223-225 (2008)
|Abstract||In his recent paper in History and Philosophy of Logic, John Kearns argues for a solution of the Liar paradox using an illocutionary logic (Kearns 2007 ). Paraconsistent approaches, especially dialetheism, which accepts the Liar as being both true and false, are rejected by Kearns as making no ?clear sense? (p. 51). In this critical note, I want to highlight some shortcomings of Kearns' approach that concern a general difficulty for supposed solutions to (semantic) antinomies like the Liar. It is not controversial that there are languages which avoid the Liar. For example, the language which consists of the single sentence ?Benedict XVI was born in Germany? lacks the resources to talk about semantics at all and thus avoids the Liar. Similarly, more interesting languages such as the propositional calculus avoid the Liar by lacking the power to express semantic concepts or to quantify over propositions. Kearns also agrees with the dialetheist claim that natural languages are semantically closed (i.e. are able to talk about their sentences and the semantic concepts and distinctions they employ). Without semantic closure, the Liar would be no real problem for us (speakers of natural languages). But given the claim, the expressive power of natural languages may lead to the semantic antinomies. The dialetheist argues for his position by proposing a general hypothesis (cf. Bremer 2005 , pp. 27?28): ?(Dilemma) A linguistic framework that solves some antinomies and is able to express its linguistic resources is confronted with strengthened versions of the antinomies?. Thus, the dialetheist claims that either some semantic concepts used in a supposed solution to a semantic antinomy are inexpressible in the framework used (and so, in view of the claim, violate the aim of being a model of natural language), or else old antinomies are exchanged for new ones. One horn of the dilemma is having inexpressible semantic properties. The other is having strengthened versions of the antinomies, once all semantic properties used are expressible. This dilemma applies, I claim, to Kearns' approach as well|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Gary Mar & Paul St Denis (1999). What the Liar Taught Achilles. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (1):29-46.
John Kearns (1999). An Illocutionary Logical Explanation of the Surprise Execution. History and Philosophy of Logic 20 (3-4):195-213.
John T. Kearns (2006). Conditional Assertion, Denial, and Supposition as Illocutionary Acts. Linguistics and Philosophy 29 (4):455 - 485.
M. Kissine (2009). Illocutionary Forces and What is Said. Mind and Language 24 (1):122-138.
Adam Rieger (2001). The Liar, the Strengthened Liar, and Bivalence. Erkenntnis 54 (2):195-203.
Stamatios Gerogiorgakis (2009). The Byzantine Liar. History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (4):313-330.
Shahid Rahman, Tero Tulenheimo & Emmanuel Genot (eds.) (2008). Unity, Truth and the Liar: The Modern Relevance of Medieval Solutions to the Liar Paradox. Springer.
Bradley Dowden, Liar Paradox. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
John Kearns (2007). An Illocutionary Logical Explanation of the Liar Paradox. History and Philosophy of Logic 28 (1):31-66.
Added to index2010-08-10
Total downloads5 ( #170,048 of 722,936 )
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?