Levels of Reflexivity: Unnoted Differences within the "Strong Programme" in the Sociology of Knowledge

Abstract
A basic question confronting programs in the sociology of science is: "Can the thesis that cognitive claims are socially determined be interpreted in a way that preserves the credibility of the sociology of science, when that thesis is reflexively applied to the sociology of science?" That question is approached here by means of a critical comparison of two versions of the "strong programme" in the sociology of knowledge. The key difference is the effort in one of the two versions (B. Barnes') to develop a context within which to articulate the distinction of science and ideology.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,357
External links
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA
    Frans Gregersen & Simo Køppe (1988). Against Epistemological Relativism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 19 (4):447-487.
    Similar books and articles
    Angelo M. Petroni (1993). Conventionalism, Scientific Discovery and the Sociology of Knowledge. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (3):225 – 240.
    Barbara Tuchańska (1990). Can Relativism Be Reconciled with Realism and Causalism? International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (3):285-294.
    Adrian Haddock (2004). Rethinking the “Strong Programme” in the Sociology of Knowledge. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 35 (1):19-40.
    Angus Gellatly (1980). Logical Necessity and the Strong Programme for the Sociology of Knowledge. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 11 (4):325-339.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2011-05-29

    Total downloads

    2 ( #258,148 of 1,088,601 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    0

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.