Levels of Reflexivity: Unnoted Differences within the "Strong Programme" in the Sociology of Knowledge
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:197 - 207 (1980)
A basic question confronting programs in the sociology of science is: "Can the thesis that cognitive claims are socially determined be interpreted in a way that preserves the credibility of the sociology of science, when that thesis is reflexively applied to the sociology of science?" That question is approached here by means of a critical comparison of two versions of the "strong programme" in the sociology of knowledge. The key difference is the effort in one of the two versions (B. Barnes') to develop a context within which to articulate the distinction of science and ideology.
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Frans Gregersen & Simo Køppe (1988). Against Epistemological Relativism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 19 (4):447-487.
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