Levels of Reflexivity: Unnoted Differences within the "Strong Programme" in the Sociology of Knowledge
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:197-207 (1980)
A basic question confronting programs in the sociology of science is: "Can the thesis that cognitive claims are socially determined be interpreted in a way that preserves the credibility of the sociology of science, when that thesis is reflexively applied to the sociology of science?" That question is approached here by means of a critical comparison of two versions of the " strong programme" in the sociology of knowledge. The key difference is the effort in one of the two versions to develop a context within which to articulate the distinction of science and ideology
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Frans Gregersen & Simo Køppe (1988). Against Epistemological Relativism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 19 (4):447-487.
Similar books and articles
Angelo M. Petroni (1993). Conventionalism, Scientific Discovery and the Sociology of Knowledge. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (3):225 – 240.
Samir Okasha (2000). The Underdetermination of Theory by Data and the "Strong Programme" in the Sociology of Knowledge. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (3):283 – 297.
Si Sun (2007). A Critique of Relativism in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 2 (1):115-130.
Robert Nola (1990). The Strong Programme for the Sociology of Science, Reflexivity and Relativism. Inquiry 33 (3):273 – 296.
Barbara Tuchańska (1990). Can Relativism Be Reconciled with Realism and Causalism? International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (3):285-294.
Timm Triplett (1986). Relativism and the Sociology of Mathematics: Remarks on Bloor, Flew, and Frege. Inquiry 29 (1-4):439-450.
Malcolm Ashmore (1989). The Reflexive Thesis: Wrighting Sociology of Scientific Knowledge. University of Chicago Press.
Adrian Haddock (2004). Rethinking the “Strong Programme” in the Sociology of Knowledge. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 35 (1):19-40.
Jeff Kochan (2010). Contrastive Explanation and the 'Strong Programme' in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge. Social Studies of Science 40 (1):127-44.
Angus Gellatly (1980). Logical Necessity and the Strong Programme for the Sociology of Knowledge. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 11 (4):325-339.
Peter Berger & Thomas Luckmann (1966/1990). The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. Anchor Books.
David Bloor (2007). Ideals and Monisms: Recent Criticisms of the Strong Programme in the Sociology of Knowledge. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (1):210-234.
Jeff Kochan (2008). Realism, Reliabilism, and the 'Strong Programme' in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (1):21 – 38.
Added to index2011-05-29
Total downloads9 ( #350,582 of 1,792,066 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #463,566 of 1,792,066 )
How can I increase my downloads?