LFG within King's descriptive formalism

Abstract
The ontology of LFG. We need to get straight what is out there in the world and what our model objects are, what are denotations and what are descriptions that get interpreted. The title of Bresnan (1982a), The Mental Representation of Grammatical Relations, seems more likely to confuse us than help us. But in the introduction, there are some fairly clear statements of how their model of human use of language is to be constructed. Kaplan & Bresnan (1982, p. 173) adopt a Competence Hypothesis which postulates some form of grammar inside the mind of a human being: We assume that an explanatory model of human language performance will incorporate a theoretically justified representation of the native speaker’s linguistic knowledge (a grammar ). Bresnan & Kaplan (1982, p. xxxi) explain how their model relates to this hypothesized grammar.
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