American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 78 (4):573-580 (2004)
|Abstract||The argument according to which there can be no demonstration that divine creative causality precludes human freedom unfolds in the context of St. Thomas’s understanding of choice and of the relation of God to the world. The gist of the argument is that any demonstration of the nature or characteristics of some effect from the cause of that effect supposes some knowledge of the nature ofthe cause. To the contrary, we know nothing of the nature of the divine causality, which is one with the divine being, and therefore etc. Before the argument, there is a word on God and second causes; on necessity and contingence; on transcendent causality; and on why it seems that creation precludes human freedom|
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