David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
The widespread use of brain imaging techniques encourages conceiving of neuroscience as the forthcoming “mindscience.” Perhaps surprisingly for many, this conclusion is still largely unwarranted. The present paper surveys various shortcomings of neuroscience as a putative “mindscience.” The analysis shows that the scope of mind (both cognitive and phenomenal) falls outside that of neuroscience. Of course, such a conclusion does not endorse any metaphysical or antiscientific stance as to the nature of the mind. Rather, it challenges a series of assumptions that the undeniable success of neuroscience has fostered. In fact, physicalism is here taken as the only viable ontological framework – an assumption that does not imply that the central nervous system exhausts the physical domain
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Riccardo Manzotti (2006). Consciousness and Existence as a Process. Mind and Matter 4 (1):7-43.
Riccardo Manzotti (2011). The Spread Mind. Is Consciousness Situated?". Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):55-78.
Riccardo Manzotti (2012). The Computational Stance is Unfit for Consciousness. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 4 (02):401-420.
Riccardo Manzotti & Giulio Sandini (2001). Does Functionalism Really Deal with the Phenomenal Side of Experience? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):993-994.
Riccardo Manzotti (2011). Is Consciousness Just Conscious Behavior? International Journal of Machine Consciousness 3 (02):353-360.
Riccardo Manzotti & Giulio Sandini (2002). What Does “Isomorphism Between Conscious Representations and the Structure of the World” Mean? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3):346-347.
Antonio Chella & Riccardo Manzotti (2007). Artificial Consciousness. Imprint Academic.
Riccardo Manzotti (2006). Book Review: Brentano's Immanent Realism and Beyond. [REVIEW] Mind and Matter 4 (1):115-119.
Riccardo Manzotti (2012). An Externalist Approach to Existential Feelings: Different Feelings or Different Objects? In Sabine Marienberg & Jörg Fingerhut (eds.), Feelings of Being Alive / Gefühle des Lebendigseins. De Gruyter 8--79.
Antonio Chella & Riccardo Manzotti (2009). Machine Consciousness: A Manifesto for Robotics. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (01):33-51.
William P. Bechtel (1986). What Happens to Accounts of Mind-Brain Relations If We Forgo an Architecture of Rules and Representations? Philosophy of Science Association 1986:159 - 171.
Riccardo Manzotti & Robert Pepperell (2013). The New Mind: Thinking Beyond the Head. [REVIEW] AI and Society 28 (2):157-166.
Added to index2012-04-13
Total downloads22 ( #127,180 of 1,707,711 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #160,112 of 1,707,711 )
How can I increase my downloads?