David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 180 (3):443 - 463 (2011)
The philosophical technical term "supervenience" is frequently used in the philosophy of mind as a concise way of characterizing the core idea of physicalism in a manner that is neutral with respect to debates between reductive physicalists and nonreductive physicalists. I argue against this alleged neutrality and side with reductive physicalists. I am especially interested here in debates between psychoneural reductionists and nonreductive functionalist physicalists. Central to my arguments will be considerations concerning how best to articulate the spirit of the idea of supervenience. I argue for a version of supervenience, "fine-grained supervenience," which is the claim that if, at a given time, a single entity instantiates two distinct mental properties, it must do so in virtue of instantiating two distinct physical properties. I argue further that despite initial appearances to the contrary, such a construal of supervenience can be embraced only by reductive physicalists
|Keywords||Supervenience Physicalism Neuroscience Reductionism|
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References found in this work BETA
Jerry A. Fodor (1975). The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press.
Daniel C. Dennett (1978). Brainstorms. MIT Press.
W. V. Quine (1960). Word and Object. The MIT Press.
David J. Chalmers (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford University Press.
Gareth Evans (1982). Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Jens Harbecke (2013). The Role of Supervenience and Constitution in Neuroscientific Research. Synthese 191 (5):1-19.
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