Sensation's ghost: The nonsensory fringe of consciousness

Psyche 7 (18) (2001)
Abstract
Non-sensory experiences represent almost all context information in consciousness. They condition most aspects of conscious cognition including voluntary retrieval, perception, monitoring, problem solving, emotion, evaluation, meaning recognition. Many peculiar aspects of non-sensory qualia (e.g., they resist being 'grasped' by an act of attention) are explained as adaptations shaped by the cognitive functions they serve. The most important nonsensory experience is coherence or "rightness." Rightness represents degrees of context fit among contents in consciousness, and between conscious and non-conscious processes. Rightness (not familiarity) is the feeling-of-knowing in implicit cognition. The experience of rightness suggests that neural mechanisms "compute" signals indicating the global dynamics of network integration
Keywords *Attention  *Cognition  *Consciousness States  *Emotions
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Citations of this work BETA
William S. Robinson (2005). Thoughts Without Distinctive Non-Imagistic Phenomenology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):534-561.
Andrea Lavazza (2009). Art as a Metaphor of the Mind. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):159-182.
Uriah Kriegel (2005). Naturalizing Subjective Character. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):23-57.

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