David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 148 (2):231 - 247 (2010)
Deviant phenomenal knowledge is knowing what it's like to have experiences of, e. g., red without actually having had experiences of red. Such a knower is a deviant. Some physicalists have argued and some anti-physicalists have denied that the possibility of deviants undermines anti-physicalism and the Knowledge Argument. The current paper presents new arguments defending the deviant-based attacks on anti-physicalism. Central to my arguments are considerations concerning the psychosemantic underpinnings of deviant phenomenal knowledge. I argue that physicalists are in a superior position to account for the conditions in virtue of which states of deviants constitute representations of phenomenal facts
|Keywords||Phenomenal knowledge Physicalism Knowledge argument Psychosemantics|
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References found in this work BETA
Saul A. Kripke (1980). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press.
Jerry A. Fodor (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press.
David J. Chalmers (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford University Press.
Hilary Putnam (1981). Reason, Truth, and History. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Craig DeLancey (2012). Consciousness and the Superfunctionality Claim. Philosophical Studies 161 (3):433-451.
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